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A federal appellate court will decide this year
whether French anti-discrimination law can
restrict freedom of speech on U.S.-based web-
sites that are accessible in France. A Paris court
ruled in 2000 that the Yahoo! website violated
French law because its users offered for sale cer-
tain Nazi artifacts. However, to force compli-
ance with the order, French plaintiffs must seek
enforcement from a U.S. court. In response,
Yahoo! sought a declaratory ruling and a feder-
al district court held that enforcing the French
order would violate the First Amendment. The
matter is now on appeal.
The Yahoo! case presents the question of
whether the Internet should be governed by
myriad local censorship laws from around the
world. U.S. courts have held uniformly that the
Internet should receive the highest degree of
First Amendment protection. They have been
influenced profoundly by the medium’s global
reach and have invalidated most restrictions so
as not to interrupt the “never-ending worldwide
conversation” that the Internet makes possible.
A contrary result in the Yahoo! case would
embrace a very different philosophy—that
Internet speakers must “show their papers” at
each nation’s borders to ensure that their speech
is acceptable to local authorities.
Other nations may treat their citizens as frag-
ile children if they wish, or worse, as enemies of
the state.   But U.S. courts should not permit the
seeds of foreign censorship to be planted on U.S.
soil by finding that such restrictions are enforce-
able here.
July 24, 2002
Introduction: 
Technologies of Freedom
An instance of the inexplicable con-
servatism and arrogance of the
Turkish customs authorities was
recently evidenced by the prohibition
of the importation of typewriters into
the country. The reason advanced by
the authorities for this step is that
typewriting affords no clew to the
author, and that therefore in the event
of seditious or opprobrious pam-
phlets or writings executed by the
typewriter being circulated it would
be impossible to obtain any clew by
which the operator of the machine
could be traced. . . . The same decree
also applies to the mimeograph and
other similar duplicating machines
and mediums.
Scientific American
July 6, 1901
The history of censorship is inextricably
intertwined with technological progress.
From the printing press, through television,
and on to the Internet, innovations in com-
munication inevitably have prompted offi-
cial efforts to limit or control new media. The
United States was the first nation to provide
formal protection for freedom of the press.
Nevertheless, despite America’s foundational
commitment to liberty for the technology of
print, policymakers and courts in the United
States historically have been slow to extend
the same freedom to newer innovations.
The Internet bucked that trend. In the brief
time between 1996 and the present, U.S. courts
were presented with a number of significant
cases involving attempts to restrict information
available on the Internet and World Wide Web.1
That growing body of law required courts to
devote significant attention to the nature of the
Internet as a medium of communication and
to assess its importance to the American system
of free expression. As a result of this review, vir-
tually every federal judge who was asked to rule
on direct censorship of protected expression on
the Internet held that such restrictions violate
either the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution or the Commerce Clause, or both.
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down key por-
tions of the Communications Decency Act, and
federal courts have invalidated similar laws in
New York, Michigan, Virginia, New Mexico,
Arizona, and Vermont.2 Most recently, the
Supreme Court held that restrictions on
Internet speech based on community stan-
dards did not necessarily invalidate a federal law
targeting such speech, but the Court kept in
place an injunction blocking the law’s enforce-
ment while lower courts grapple with other dif-
ficult issues, including whether the law bans
too much speech, is unconstitutionally vague,
or supplants less restrictive alternatives.3
The consensus thus far is that the Internet
fulfills the ultimate promise of the First
Amendment and should receive the highest
level of constitutional protection. The Supreme
Court found that the information available on
the Internet is as “‘diverse as human thought’”
with the capability of providing instant access
to information on topics ranging from “the
music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS
prevention to the Chicago Bulls.”4 Judge Stuart
Dalzell of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania characterized
the Internet as “a never-ending worldwide con-
versation” and “the most participatory form of
mass speech yet developed.”5 Judge Lowell Reed
wrote that in “the medium of cyberspace . . .
anyone can build a soap box out of web pages
and speak her mind in the virtual village green
to an audience larger and more diverse than any
the Framers could have imagined.”6 Another
district court judge, noting that “[i]t is probably
safe to say that more ideas and information are
shared on the Internet than in any other medi-
um,” suggested that it may be only a slight over-
statement to conclude that “the Internet repre-
sents a brave new world of free speech.”7
One key aspect of this “brave new world”
that has played a central role in the decisions
to fully protect Internet speech is the global
nature of the medium. The Supreme Court
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described the Internet as a “‘unique and whol-
ly new medium of worldwide human commu-
nication’” that makes information available
“‘not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo
and Prague.’”8 As it more recently noted, “One
can use the Web to read thousands of newspa-
pers published around the globe” and “can
access material about topics ranging from
aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.”9 Cyberspace
has no particular geographical location, has
no centralized control point, and is available
to anyone, anywhere in the world with
access.10 It is “ambient—nowhere in particular
and everywhere at once.”11 That quality makes
geography “a virtually meaningless construct
on the Internet.”12 Accordingly, U.S. courts
have been strongly influenced by the “unique
character of these new electronic media.”13
Such a reaction is not unexpected where a
free and open medium of communication is
compatible with a political system predicated
on the free exchange of ideas. But that also is
the very reason the Internet is seen as a threat
in societies that lack the same free speech tra-
ditions as the United States. Other nations
have responded to the advent of the Internet
in various ways, ranging from open hostility to
attempts to regulate it in the same way as tra-
ditional electronic media. Such divergent
national responses to technology and political
freedom are nothing new and historically have
had little impact on the United States. But
when such differences are applied to a global
medium of communication, the resulting
legal conflict can have significant ramifica-
tions for freedom of speech in this country.
The Yahoo! Case
A decision by a county court in France has
crystallized questions arising from the appli-
cation of national standards to an interna-
tional medium. The case began in April 2000,
when La Ligue contre le Racisme et
l’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and L’Union des
Etudiants Juifs  de France (UEJF), two orga-
nizations opposed to racism and anti-
Semitism, sent a “cease and desist” letter to
the California headquarters of the Internet
service Yahoo!, demanding that “unless you
cease presenting Nazi objects [on the U.S.
online auction site] within 8 days, we shall
size [sic] the competent jurisdiction to force
your company to abide by [French] law.” The
law on which the demand was based, Article
R645-1 of the French Criminal Code, pro-
hibits the display of any symbol associated
with an organization deemed criminal, such
as the Nazis.14
Yahoo! is an Internet service provider that
operates various websites and Internet-based
services that are offered through its main
U.S. servers as well as through servers operat-
ed by foreign subsidiaries. Yahoo! subsidiary
corporations operate regional services in 20
countries (for example, Yahoo! India and
Yahoo! Korea) through websites that use the
local region’s primary language, direct their
services to the local population, and abide by
local laws. Yahoo!’s services include an auto-
mated auction site, online shopping, e-mail,
a search engine, personal webpage hostings,
Internet chat rooms, and club listings. The
auction site allows users to post items for sale
and to solicit bids from other users from
around the world. In short, Yahoo! epito-
mizes the type of worldwide communication
made possible on the Internet. Yahoo!’s
home website (http://www.yahoo.com) is
accessible globally, even though its services
are in English, are oriented toward a U.S.
audience, and are hosted entirely on servers
located in the United States.
That the Yahoo! U.S. site can be reached
by French citizens was the basis of the
demand by LICRA and UEJF. They did not
send a cease and desist letter to Yahoo!
France, the regional subsidiary that serves the
local population, because that service com-
plies with French law, including Article 645-
1. Instead, it was sent to Yahoo!’s U.S. service,
which is, like all Internet-based services, avail-
able internationally for those who seek it.
When Yahoo! declined to alter its U.S.-based
service in response to the demand, the
French groups filed suit in Paris.
In May 2000 the French court ordered
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Yahoo! to “dissuade and render impossible”
any access via yahoo.com by Internet users in
France to the Yahoo! Internet auction site dis-
playing Nazi artifacts, including objects, relics,
insignia, emblems, and flags. It also ordered
Yahoo! to block access by French citizens to
personal webpages displaying text, extracts, or
quotations from such works as Adolf Hitler’s
Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
the anti-Semitic report of the czarist secret
police. After an interval during which the court
heard evidence on the technical feasibility of its
order, it reaffirmed its directive for Yahoo! in
November 2000 and ordered it to “take all nec-
essary measures to dissuade and make impossi-
ble any access via Yahoo.com to the auction ser-
vice for Nazi merchandise as well as to any other
site or service that may be construed as an apol-
ogy for Nazism or contesting the reality of Nazi
crimes.”15 The French court held that “the sim-
ple act of displaying [Nazi artifacts] in France
violates Article R645-1 of the Penal Code and
therefore [is] a threat to internal public order.”16
It described the mere availability of such infor-
mation as “a connecting link with France,
which renders our jurisdiction perfectly compe-
tent to rule in this matter.”17
In specific terms, the order of the Paris
county court directed Yahoo! to (1) reengineer
its content servers in the United States and
elsewhere to enable them to recognize French
Internet protocol (IP) addresses and block
access to Nazi material by end users assigned
such IP addresses, (2) require end users with
“ambiguous” IP addresses to provide Yahoo!
with a declaration of nationality when they
arrive at Yahoo!’s home page or when they ini-
tiate any search using the word “Nazi,” and (3)
implement these changes within three
months or face a penalty of 100,000 francs
(approximately $13,300) for each day of non-
compliance. The French court order also pro-
vided that the penalties assessed against
Yahoo! Inc. may not be collected from Yahoo!
France. In other words, if the plaintiff groups
want to enforce the judgment, they must per-
suade a U.S. court to recognize it and apply it
against Yahoo!’s U.S. service.
The French Yahoo! decision cuts sharply
against the grain of the emerging jurisprudence
in the United States that strongly protects
Internet speech because of its global reach. The
French view is not that geography is “a virtually
meaningless construct on the Internet” but
that geography is all-important and should
determine what information should be avail-
able online. It envisions a world in which
Internet surfers must “show their papers” at the
border, even when that border exists in a server
located wholly outside the nation whose law
would be applied. Accordingly, the French
Yahoo! decision represents a direct attempt by a
foreign nation to apply its law extraterritorially
to restrict the freedom of expression of U.S.-
based online speakers who are protected by the
First Amendment. 
You Say That Like 
It’s a Bad Thing
The French Yahoo! decision has its defend-
ers—not just among Europeans who sneer at
America’s “free speech fetish.” Supporters
include people who evidently would like to see
the Internet get its comeuppance. Sebastian
Mallaby of the Washington Post’s editorial page
staff cited the Yahoo! case to support his con-
clusion that “the real story on the Net these
days is that the cyberanarchists are losing.” He
noted the existence of technology “that can
pinpoint the geographic whereabouts of
cybernauts.” “Once that is done,” he conclud-
ed, “French surfers can be blocked from Nazi
sites while leaving Americans to enjoy the full
freedoms of the First Amendment.” Such cre-
ative use of law and technology debunks “[t]he
old cyberanarchist nostrum that national gov-
ernments can no longer expect to enforce
national laws.”18
Mallaby’s repeated use of the word “cyber-
anarchist” as an epithet brings to mind the
recent Vatican position paper decrying the
“radical libertarianism” of the Internet.19 The
paper notes that a consequence of deregula-
tion has been “a shift of power from national
states to transnational corporations” and
that the Internet has produced “a mindset
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opposed to anything smacking of legitimate
regulation for public responsibility.” That
has led to an “exaggerated individualism”
and a view of cyberspace as a “new realm”
where “every sort of expression was allowed
and the only law was total individual liberty
to do as one pleased.” 
In the Vatican’s view, “[T]he only commu-
nity whose rights and interests would be
truly recognized” would be “the community
of radical libertarians.” Such thinking
“remains influential in some circles,” accord-
ing to the Vatican paper, “supported by
familiar libertarian arguments also used to
defend pornography and violence in the
media generally.”20 Describing the “ideology
of radical libertarianism” as both mistaken
and harmful to “legitimate free expression in
the service of truth,” the paper concludes
that the Internet “is no more exempt than
other media from reasonable laws against
hate speech, libel, fraud, child pornography
and pornography in general.” Accordingly, it
calls for “international cooperation in setting
standards and establishing mechanisms to
promote and protect the common good.”21
Coming, as it did, just as stories were
breaking about the pedophilia scandals in
the Catholic Church and decades of cover-
ups, the Vatican paper’s theme of “freedom”
versus “truth” might seem a bit hypocriti-
cal.22 Nevertheless, the pontifical pronounce-
ment dovetails with Mallaby’s conclusions
that “government must act as the ultimate
enforcer” of norms in cyberspace23 and that
the “real debate will not be whether you can
enforce rules on the Net but how the
enforcers should adapt to the new medi-
um.”24 In addition to discussing the French
Yahoo! case, Mallaby pointed out that the
Chinese dictatorship has found new ways to
stifle dissent online: “The regime blocks out
much of the content it dislikes, official news
agencies get a new way of disseminating the
party line and dissidents become the victims
of Web-enabled smear tactics.”25 As for regu-
lating pornography, Mallaby notes, “Scary
offshore porn sites won’t seem so scary any-
more. If a government wants to block them,
it can tell credit card companies not to
process payments to them.”26
Mallaby has recognized that applying
myriad national laws to cyberspace could
cause the Net to “lose some its borderless
appeal” and that we risk converting the
World Wide Web to “Numerous National
Nets.”27 He notes, for example, that an online
magazine oriented toward teens could violate
the law in countries with severe restrictions
on advertising to children. But from the per-
spective of other countries, Mallaby con-
cludes, there is no reason to abandon local
regulation. “If a European country feels
strongly about marketing to kids, why
should it let American publishers subvert its
policies? Countries have varying regulations
for the good reason that cultures vary. The
Internet won’t change that.”28
Professor Jack Goldsmith of the University
of Chicago School of Law agrees with this
assessment: “When French citizens are on the
receiving end of an offshore communication
that their government deems harmful, France
has every right to take steps within its territory
to check and redress the harm.”29 Although
Goldsmith assumes incorrectly that “[a] coun-
try can enforce its regulations only against com-
panies with assets in its territory,” he describes
the French Yahoo! decision (which applies pri-
marily to Yahoo! in the United States and not
to Yahoo! France) as a “reasonable middle
ground.” He argues that it is legitimate to force
offshore content providers to use filtering tech-
nology “to identify recipients of information by
geography and screen out content to them.”30
Goldsmith acknowledges that such measures
will “marginally raise the cost of doing e-busi-
ness” but concludes that geographical filtering
will “force Yahoo! to take account of the true
social cost of its auction activities.”31
A Little Bit Pregnant
Goldsmith’s balancing approach assumes
that cross-border regulation of the Internet
can be carefully calibrated by using technolo-
gy to keep information out of restrictive juris-
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dictions while allowing its free availability
everywhere else. Unfortunately, the real world
is not so amenable to such neat solutions that
sound plausible only in academic journals (or
in France). The sheer volume of information,
much of it posted by third parties, and the fact
that it is constantly changing distinguish the
type of communication available on the
Internet from most traditional communica-
tion. Attempting to restrict the availability of
information in certain countries on Yahoo!’s
auction website is not the same thing as
declining to publish a book in England
because of its plaintiff-friendly libel laws or
refusing to mail an adult video to Tennessee
for fear of its Bible-belt obscenity standards. 
Under the logic of the French Yahoo! deci-
sion, an Internet publisher or web host must
create filters to block access to any content
that is illegal in the jurisdictions in which its
service is available—that is, everywhere. The
publisher need not preclude access to all
offending content in all jurisdictions but
may use geographic filtering to coordinate its
blocking decisions with local laws. Even
assuming this is technically possible, it pre-
sents web publishers with a daunting task. At
least 59 different countries limit freedom of
expression online.32 Theoretically, publishers
would have to code each item of information
they posted (or otherwise made available) to
meet each of the national standards, and set
their geographic filters to block access to the
content in the relevant jurisdictions. A few
examples illustrate the widely varying restric-
tions that would apply.
China
The People’s Republic of China severely
restricts communication via the Internet,
including all forms of dissent and the free
reporting of news. The so-called Measures for
Managing Internet Information Services are
regulations that prohibit private websites
from publishing “news” without prior
approval from Communist Party officials.33
Another set of laws, known as the Seven No’s,
bars the publication of materials that negate
“the guiding role of Marxism, Leninism, Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s theories,” go
against “the guiding principles, official line or
policies of the Communist Party,” or violate
“party propaganda discipline.” Chinese law
also bans “content that guides people in the
wrong direction, is vulgar or low.”34 Armed
with that authority, Chinese officials are try-
ing to stop online protest messages available
on overseas websites, particularly those locat-
ed in the United States, from which so much
pro-democracy speech emanates.35 Such
restrictions pose a particular threat to groups
like VIP Reference (also known as Dacankao),
the leading Chinese pro-democracy electronic
newsletter. Although it is based in Washington,
D.C., VIP Reference is read by countless individ-
uals in mainland China.36 If U.S. courts begin
enforcing foreign speech standards such as
the French law that gave rise to the judgment
against Yahoo!, Chinese authorities could pur-
sue similar quasi-civil penalties in the hopes of
silencing other pro-democracy speech.
Singapore
The Singapore Broadcasting Authority
maintains strict control over the free speech
activities of that country’s Internet users. A U.S.
human rights audit explained that the SBA has
regulated access to content on the Internet
since 1996 by licensing both domestic websites
and ISPs. Service providers must install “proxy
servers” that filter out content that the govern-
ment considers objectionable. The SBA directs
service providers to block access to webpages
that, in the government’s view, undermine pub-
lic security, national defense, racial and reli-
gious harmony, and public morals. In 1997 the
SBA announced an Internet Code of Practice to
block access to material that contains pornog-
raphy or excessive violence or that incites racial
or religious hatred.37 In July 2001 the govern-
ment of Singapore imposed new restrictions on
political content, which led at least one organi-
zation, Sintercom, to shut down its online
activities.38
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia bans publishing or even
accessing various types of online expression,
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including “[a]nything contrary to the state or
its system,” “[n]ews damaging to the Saudi
Arabian armed forces,” “[a]nything damag-
ing to the dignity of heads of states,” “[a]ny
false information ascribed to state officials,”
“[s]ubversive ideas,” and “[s]landerous or
libellous [sic] material.”39 All 30 of the coun-
try’s ISPs are linked to a ground-floor room
at the Riyadh Internet entranceway, where all
of the country’s web activity is stored in mas-
sive cache files and screened for offensive or
sacrilegious material before it is released to
individual users.40 The central servers are
configured to block access to “sensitive” sites
that might violate “the social, cultural, polit-
ical, media, economic, and religious values of
the Kingdom.”41 Several key overseas web-
sites have received special scrutiny and block-
ing, including the Movement for Islamic
Reform in Arabia—a group based in England.
Saudi Arabian authorities have also issued a
fatwa against Pokémon, claiming that the
popular children’s games and cards possess
the minds of children while promoting gam-
bling and Zionism.42
Syria
Syria bans many types of content on the
Internet, such as statements that would
endanger “national unity” or otherwise
divulge “state secrets”—categories that include
pro-Israeli speech.43 Syrian citizens can be
jailed for sending e-mail to people overseas
without government authorization. Syrian
authorities enforce the bans in several ways,
including by intensive surveillance. Online
access is severely restricted. There is only one
Internet service provider in the country, which
is government run and imposes heavy block-
ing and monitoring schemes.44
Australia
The Australian government has issued reg-
ulations that bar many forms of expression on
the Internet. Amendments to the Broadcast-
ing Services Act require Australian-based con-
tent hosts to deny access to sites that lack con-
tent-based classifications or are X-rated. In
addition, the scheme is designed to deny
Australian minors access to any R-rated web-
sites. Specifically, access to Internet content
hosted outside Australia may be prohibited if
the Internet content has been classified RC or
X by the Classification Board.45 The list of sub-
jects that can be banned as unsuitable for
minors includes suicide, crime, corruption,
marital problems, emotional trauma, drug
and alcohol dependency, death and serious ill-
ness, racism, and religious issues.46 Violators
may be subject to website shutdowns and
other criminal penalties.47
Italy
Italy restricts both online and offline
speech in various ways. The Italian constitu-
tion contains broad language that forbids
“[p]rinted publications, performances, and all
other exhibits offensive to public morality.”48
Italy also allows law enforcement agents to
seize questionable “periodical publications”
under certain conditions.49 The ability of the
state to regulate speech gains added signifi-
cance in light of a recent court decision declar-
ing that those standards should be applied
globally—not just in Italy. A Roman tribunal
held that it has the power to shut down for-
eign websites to the extent they can be viewed
in Italy.50 The court found that “if confronted
with a [defamatory statement] initiated
abroad and terminated . . . in our Country, the
Italian State is entitled to jurisdiction and the
meting [out] of punishment.”51 The court
added that “the use of the Internet for defam-
atory statement embodies one of the cases of
aggravation described in Article 595 of the
penal code” and that in this case “the sender
deserves to be meted a more severe form of
punishment.”52 The court’s decision may well
have been influenced by the fact that the
speech at issue contained not only statements
about a private party but also “extremely neg-
ative defamatory opinions” about “the work
of the Italian judicial authorities.”53
Sweden
Swedish laws ban several types of Internet
speech, including “illegal description of vio-
lence” and “racial agitation.”54 Those stric-
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tures require the proprietors of “electronic
bulletin boards” to remove or make inacces-
sible such content.55 In March 2002 a
Swedish court applied those rules to the web-
site of the country’s biggest newspaper,
Aftonbladet, and fined the website’s editor for
anonymous statements posted to the news-
paper’s online comment forum.56
France über Alles
Because the French Yahoo! decision
applies to Yahoo! U.S., the plaintiffs in that
case must seek enforcement of the order by
an American court. Normally, courts will
enforce such foreign judgments as a matter
of international cooperation. However, the
Yahoo! case presents special problems since
enforcing the judgment here would have
practical and legal ramifications that extend
far beyond one nation’s law or a single court
order. It would establish a legal framework
wherein all websites on the global Internet
potentially are subject to the laws of all other
nations, regardless of the extent to which
such a requirement conflicts with the law of
the place where the speakers are located. Any
finding that the French order may be
enforced in the United States portends the
development of an international law under
which any nation would be able to enforce its
legal and cultural “local community stan-
dards” on speakers in all other nations. In
such a regime, Internet service providers and
content providers would have no practical
choice but to restrict their speech to the low-
est common denominator in order to avoid
potentially crushing liability.
The impact of such a lowest common
denominator approach is not measured by
counting the number of nations that already
have sought to apply their laws beyond their
borders, although that number is growing. It
is determined by assessing the effects on web-
site operators, considering how the chal-
lenged rule “may interact with the legitimate
regulatory regimes of other [nations] and
what effect would arise if not one, but many
or every, [nation] adopted similar legisla-
tion.”57 By that standard, web publishers
could be forced to block access to informa-
tion that “sabotages national unity” in
China, undermines “religious harmony and
public morals” in Singapore, offends “the
social, cultural, political, media, economic,
and religious values” of Saudi Arabia, fosters
“pro-Israeli speech” in Syria, facilitates view-
ing unrated or inappropriately rated websites
in Australia, or makes available information
“offensive to public morality” in Italy—to cite
just a few examples.
Many web publishers and service
providers likely would cease offering content
that could run afoul of such restrictions. But
assuming it even is possible to monitor the
various national requirements as they might
apply to all of the information available via a
particular site, and to calibrate filters accord-
ingly, the impact on Internet communica-
tion would be significant. In the internation-
al arena, inconsistent regulation of Internet
content acts like a “customs dut[y].”58 A 1997
White House report on electronic commerce
called for a minimum of international gov-
ernment regulation and warned that content
regulation “could cripple the growth and
diversity of the Internet.” It described con-
tent regulations as nontariff trade barriers.59
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce
has said, “Full realization of the economic
promise of information technology depends
on the development of the same safeguards
and predictable legal environment that indi-
viduals and businesses have come to expect
in the offline world.”60
By contrast, refusing to enforce the
French judgment would in no way under-
mine the rule of law in France. France has full
authority to regulate the behavior of its citi-
zenry and to require that citizens limit their
web browsing to conform to local norms, just
as other nations do. Countries such as China,
Singapore, and Saudi Arabia permit their cit-
izens to see only officially approved websites
and use technology to try to block access to
nonconforming sites. Such policies may
offend American notions of free expression
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and respect for the individual, but if other
nations want to treat their citizens like frag-
ile children, that is not the concern of the
U.S. government. Such repressive policies
present a significant problem here only if the
American government is enlisted as a partner
in enforcing foreign speech restrictions on
U.S.-based speakers.
Yahoo! Take Two
After the French court reaffirmed its ini-
tial order, Yahoo! took preemptive action in
the United States. It filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, seeking a rul-
ing that the French judgment is unenforce-
able because it is inconsistent with U.S. con-
stitutional law and policy. While the judge in
Paris had reasoned that requiring Yahoo! “to
extend its ban to symbols of Nazism” would
satisfy “an ethical and moral imperative
shared by all democratic societies,” the ques-
tion Yahoo! raised in the U.S. forum is
whether that “moral imperative” includes
censoring disfavored speech.
Judgments of foreign courts are not enti-
tled to automatic recognition or enforce-
ment in American courts. Whether a U.S.
court will honor a foreign judgment is deter-
mined by principles of international respect
and cooperation.61 Among those is the rule
that a court need not enforce a foreign judg-
ment if to do so will offend the public policy
of the nation where the court has jurisdic-
tion.62 A classic example of a foreign judg-
ment that will not be enforced on public pol-
icy grounds is a ruling that unconstitutional-
ly impairs individual rights of personal liber-
ty.63 This includes a judgment based on laws
or procedures that do not comport with fun-
damental First Amendment principles.64
Similarly, judgments cannot be enforced if
they violate an explicit public policy
expressed by Congress. 
The Yahoo! order highlighted the stark
differences in the way nations value freedom
of expression. The French law prohibiting
the mere viewing of Nazi insignia, including
its display on plainly expressive items such as
books or flags, flies in the face of fundamen-
tal principles of free expression. In the United
States, the Supreme Court has held that the
most stringent protections of the First
Amendment protect marching in Nazi uni-
forms, displaying the swastika, and even
“[d]istributing pamphlets or displaying . . .
materials which incite or promote hatred
against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry,
race or religion.”65 That is because our con-
stitutional jurisprudence is based on the fol-
lowing understanding:
Those who won our independence . . .
believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly dis-
cussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily
adequate protection against the dis-
semination of noxious doctrine.66
As the Supreme Court explained recently,
“The history of the law of free expression is
one of vindication in cases involving speech
that many citizens may find shabby, offen-
sive, or even ugly.”67
Constitutional law does not stringently
protect such “low-value” speech because of a
belief that “one idea is as good as any other,
and that in art and literature objective stan-
dards of style, taste, decorum, beauty, and
esthetics are deemed by the Constitution to
be inappropriate, indeed unattainable.”
Rather, the First Amendment protects such
speech “precisely so that opinions and judg-
ments, including esthetic and moral judg-
ments about art and literature [and politics],
can be formed, tested, and expressed.” In our
system, “these judgments are for the individ-
ual to make, not for the Government to
decree, even with the mandate or approval of
a majority.”68
On the basis of those principles, U.S. courts
have refused to enforce defamation judg-
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ments based on foreign law because of the
strict First Amendment limits of American
libel law.69 For example, in Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that enforcement of an English libel
judgment would be contrary to public policy
as embodied in the First Amendment even
though the allegedly defamatory statements
were published only in the London Daily
Telegraph.70 Similarly, in Ellis v. Time, Inc., a
plaintiff brought suit in the United States
under both American and English law and
argued that the court should apply the more
restrictive English defamation law for articles
published in England. The court disagreed,
holding that applying English law in the
United States would violate the Constitu-
tion.71 The court held that “United States
courts must apply rules of law consistent with
the Constitution, regardless of where the
alleged wrong occurs.”72
Judicial decisions extending First
Amendment protections to the Internet, as
well as congressional recognition of the value
of free expression online, further distinguish
the United States from other nations. For
example, it is the statutory law of the United
States that “[n]o provider or user of an inter-
active computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by another information content
provider.”73 Section 230 of the Communi-
cations Act establishes the clear policy that
the public interest is best served by “pro-
mot[ing] the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices” and by “preserv[ing] the vibrant and
competitive free market” for these services,
“unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”74
Accordingly, Congress has created “a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the ser-
vice.”75 U.S. courts have applied this statuto-
ry immunity broadly.76
Such immunity from liability for third-
party content is not the international norm.
In Godfrey v. Demon Internet, Ltd., for example,
an English court held that an ISP could be
held responsible for defamatory postings by
a third party to the extent it made news-
groups containing the postings available.
The court considered U.S. authorities,
including Section 230, and concluded that
British law “did not adopt this approach or
have this purpose.”77 It also noted, “The
impact of the First Amendment has resulted
in a substantial divergence of approach
between American and English defamation
law.”78 As in the traditional defamation cases,
there are significant differences between U.S.
policies and those of other nations with
respect to third-party liability for Internet
service providers.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California considered the signif-
icant differences between U.S. and French
law regarding free expression and held that
the Yahoo! order could not be enforced in
the United States. Judge Fogel wrote that
“the French order’s content and viewpoint-
based regulation of the web pages and auc-
tion site of Yahoo.com, while entitled to
great deference as an articulation of French
law, clearly would be inconsistent with the
First Amendment if mandated by a court in
the United States.”79 “Although France has
a sovereign right to regulate what speech is
permissible in France,” he reasoned, “this
Court may not enforce a foreign order that
violates the protections of the United
States Constitution by chilling protected
speech that occurs simultaneously within
our borders.”80
Judge Fogel’s decision was unaffected by
the French court’s shaky finding that
Yahoo!’s auction site could be “filtered” geo-
graphically to block access to forbidden
items only to French citizens. Noting that the
foreign order would affect Yahoo!’s actions
“in the United States” and how it “configures
and operates its auction and Yahoo.com
sites,” he found the question of whether
Yahoo! “possesses the technology to comply
with the rule” to be “immaterial.”81 Judge
Fogel wrote that the French order would
require Yahoo! not only to “render it impos-
sible for French citizens to access the pro-
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scribed content” but also “to interpret an
impermissibly overbroad and vague defini-
tion” of what is prohibited. Accordingly, he
found that enforcement of the French order
against Yahoo! would be inconsistent with
the First Amendment because compliance
would involve an impermissible restriction
on speech.82
And the Beat Goes On . . .
The district court’s decision was an
important milestone in securing First
Amendment protections on the global
Internet, but it is by no means the end of the
story. The French parties appealed the deci-
sion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and argued that the lower
court should not have exerted jurisdiction
over them since they were taking actions only
in France to vindicate their rights under
French law. Seemingly oblivious to the fact
that the French court’s order seeks to limit
speech on Yahoo’s servers in the United
States, they complain, without a trace of
irony, that Judge Fogel’s decision would “give
United States Courts worldwide jurisdiction
over any non-forum conduct that has the
potential of offending local sensibilities.”83
The court of appeals may decide the case by
the end of 2002 or early 2003.
Meanwhile, the civil court findings in
France have become the basis for a criminal
prosecution of Yahoo!’s former CEO
Timothy Koogle, who resides in the United
States, under the French Press Law of 1881.84
In February 2002 the Paris Criminal Court
declined to dismiss the charges, based on
facts similar to those in the earlier civil case,
and held that the case could go forward.85
The court was unimpressed by Judge Fogel’s
ruling in the United States and noted,
“Following the example of the district judge
for the Northern District of California, the
French judge is free to adopt his own princi-
ples of international criminal jurisdiction to
sanction offenses that are completely or par-
tially committed abroad and are likely to
threaten national interests” to the extent that
“the website’s message or contents are made
accessible, through the Internet, within
French territory.”
The court held that providing public
access to an auction site offering Nazi articles
“and which Internet users can access by
virtue of the mere existence of a ‘search’ link
inviting them, establishes” the predicate ele-
ment of “publicity” for the crime of justifying
war crimes and that it is not necessary “that
the Internet users be specifically solicited by
the owner of the website.”86 The court
deemed irrelevant the fact that Yahoo.com is
“based in the United States and intended for
the American public.” Rather, the court con-
cluded that it is appropriate to apply French
criminal law “even if the alleged offense is not
prohibited by the criminal laws of the coun-
try of origin of the presumed operator of the
acts or the country where the website’s host is
geographically located.”87
Although Timothy Koogle left his job at
Yahoo! in May 2001, the court found that he
may still be found liable for offending auc-
tion postings under French law. If convicted,
he could face up to five years in prison and
fines of approximately $40,000. The princi-
pal effect of criminal action in France, how-
ever, is that Koogle should not plan on vaca-
tioning in Paris any time soon. 
The effect of such laws will become more
widespread under a proposed side agreement
to a European treaty on crime in cyberspace.
The 43-member Council of Europe (CoE) last
November ratified a Convention on
Cybercrime, the first international treaty on
criminal offenses committed through the use
of the Internet and other computer networks.
Although the CoE is comprised of European
nations, the United States was one of four
nonmember signatories to the convention.
The main aim of the convention, accord-
ing to its preamble, is to “pursue, as a matter
of priority, a common criminal policy aimed
at the protection of society against cyber-
crime” and to take measures such as “adopt-
ing appropriate legislation and fostering
international co-operation.” The convention
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deals in particular with offenses related to
infringements of copyright, computer-relat-
ed fraud, and child pornography and
offences connected with network security. It
also covers a series of procedural powers such
as searches for and interception of material
on computer networks. 
An additional protocol to the convention,
expected to be finalized soon, would oblige
signatories to “adopt legislative and other
measures as may be necessary” to criminalize
“distributing or otherwise making available
racist or xenophobic material to the public
through a computer system”; “insulting pub-
licly, through a computer system, persons for
the reason that they belong” to an ethnic,
racial, national, or religious group; and dis-
tributing material “which denies, grossly
minimizes, approves or justifies . . . genocide
or crimes against humanity.” It also would
require the adoption of laws prohibiting
“aiding or abetting the commission of any of
the offenses established in accordance with
this Protocol, with intent that such offense
be committed.”88 A draft explanatory report
makes clear that those provisions are intend-
ed to apply to, among other things, the
exchange of racist and xenophobic material
in Internet chat rooms or by postings on
newsgroups and discussion fora.89 The pro-
tocol was developed as a side agreement so as
not to impede ratification of the main con-
vention by the United States and other
nations that might have a conflict with the
new provision. Although the United States is
not expected to sign it, the protocol will exac-
erbate the problems presented by the French
Yahoo! case. 
The adoption of the protocol by CoE
members will place added pressure on the
United States to go along, but that pressure
should be resisted. It may be extremely
doubtful that the United States could find a
way to comply with the protocol that would
survive First Amendment scrutiny in any
event, but this country should affirm its
commitment to constitutional principles by
rejecting the protocol categorically. Although
such measures are vulnerable under
American law, they become less so if we begin
to entertain the notion that it is legitimate
for governments to dictate matters of indi-
vidual conscience. As Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson warned, “[T]he First Amendment
to our Constitution was designed to avoid
these ends by avoiding these beginnings.”90
Epilogue
The struggle between government author-
ities and the technologies of free expression is
hardly new. A century ago, Turkish customs
officials sought to quell seditious pamphlets
by keeping typewriters out of the country.
Even now, the North Korean dictatorship of
Kim Jong Il directs government officials to
“tighten controls over use of typewriters and
photocopiers.”91 Jamming of Western radio
broadcasts was widely practiced in the Soviet
bloc during the Cold War until the practice
was terminated officially in November 1988.
Such technical measures, while initially effec-
tive, were abandoned eventually as futile.
Lech Walesa wrote: “When it came to radio
waves, the iron curtain was helpless. Nothing
could stop the news from coming through—
neither sputniks nor mine fields, high walls
nor barbed wire. The frontiers could be
closed; words could not.”92 Whether jam-
ming was effective or not, the costs were
colossal. In 1956 the jamming operation in
Poland alone cost $1.4 million and used
enough electricity to supply a medium-sized
town. In 1981 the BBC estimated that the
cost of four days of jamming by the Russians
was equal to the annual budget of BBC’s
Russian radio service.93
The Internet has upped the ante on these
issues by empowering individuals to commu-
nicate instantly with others across the planet.
This unprecedented power of the medium to
transmit and receive information has
increased the sense of urgency on the part of
some in authority to limit disfavored speech,
whether that speech takes the form of pro-
democracy writings, Nazi memorabilia, or
sexually explicit imagery. The technology of
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the Internet makes this extremely difficult,
for as Internet pioneer John Gilmore has
said, “The Internet treats censorship as sys-
tem damage and routes around it.” Yet, while
the nature of the medium makes it inherently
difficult to prevent Internet speech, a num-
ber of governments have focused on restrict-
ing the speakers themselves.
In this regard, the ability to impose
“futile” censorship regimes can have a signif-
icant effect. With radio jamming at least, the
governments that sought to block foreign
messages bore their own costs, a factor that
contributed to the demise of the practice. But
if foreign judgments can be used to impose
costs on U.S.-based Internet speakers, either
by requiring the use of filtering systems or by
levying fines, they may lead to widespread
restrictions on speech regardless of the inef-
fectiveness of the technical “fixes.” Professor
Goldsmith may characterize this as forcing
Yahoo! “to take account of the true social
cost of its auction activities,”94 but the effect
would be to change fundamentally the open
nature of the medium by allowing foreign
governments to “tax” free speech. For that
reason, Judge Fogel held correctly that
enforcement of the French Yahoo! judgment
in the United States would be repugnant to
First Amendment values, and his decision
should be upheld on appeal.
One final point about futility is worth
mentioning. French laws prohibiting the dis-
play of Nazi artifacts and restricting speech
generally have done nothing to prevent the
recent burnings of synagogues in France, nor
have they forestalled frustrations that led to
the rise of right-wing politicians like the
National Front’s Jean-Marie Le Pen. To the
contrary, restrictions on speech may con-
tribute to such phenomena by impairing the
social safety valve that free expression pro-
vides. While nothing requires the French to
embrace the First Amendment’s philosophy
that society is better protected by more
speech than by enforced silence, our consti-
tutional traditions should prevent France
from exporting its parochial restrictions
here.
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